A few papers in the legal literature explained the characteristics of recent SPACs. 4 In the financial literature Jog and Sun (2007) and Boyer and Baigent (2008) were the first to offer more intense research on SPACs. This paper documents changes in the corporate design of SPACs and explain their evolution. Additionally, the paper examines the impact of SPAC stakeholders on the success of merger. None of these issues are fully explained in the current literature on SPACs.
1 "The American "investment" trusts functioned as blind speculative pools, administered in many cases by men of reputation and ability who were carried away by the universal madness. These new "creations" played a double role in intensifying the speculative orgy, for they were themselves both active speculators and active media of speculation." Graham and Dodd (1934) . 2 Blank check is a company that issues penny stock in order to finance its involvement in establishing a business in which principal operations have not yet commenced. In the late 1990s, the Security and Exchange Commission revoked licenses of more than 10 blank check market promoters which lead to a complete ceasing of their market. Hale (2007) , Heyman (2007) , Reimer (2007) , Sjostrom (2007) . Jog and Sun (2007) examine characteristics of SPACs and refer to the SEC's definition of blank check companies as "a development stage company that has no specific business plan, or purpose, or has indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company, other entity, or person." A SPAC is created to pool funds in order to finance a merger or acquisition opportunity within a set time frame. The merger opportunity
usually has yet to be identified.
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A SPAC is a clean shell company 6 that acquires public status through the unit IPO and is specifically formed to purchase one or more operating businesses over a certain amount of time, usually two years. Proceeds raised through the IPO are placed in escrow accounts with a credible financial institution and are kept there until the SPAC founders close a deal with potential targets. If an appropriate target is not found within the two-year period after the IPO, the SPAC is liquidated and funds from the escrow accounts are returned to investors. Units issued by SPACs are immediately tradable, while trading with warrants and shares starts after the date by which underwriters exercise overallotment rights. 7 On average, trading of warrants and common shares starts four weeks after the IPO. SPACs used to be traded on American Stock Exchange 
Literature review
The current literature on SPACs analyzes various aspects such as the institutional structure, the incentives of major stakeholders, the performance of issued securities and the factors determining successful mergers executed by SPACs. Studies on the institutional structure and design of SPAC securities refer to Schultz (1993) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) and Garner and Marshal (2007) . Schultz (1993) models why companies use units, that is a bundle of common stock and warrants, during the initial public offering and why they commit to issue more stocks at a future date at the exercise price of the warrant. He finds that the major obstacles are their small size, low earnings and low value of assets. Additionally, he sees units as the solution for the agencycost problem resulting from the free cash flow awarded to managers at the time of the IPO.
8 Berger (2008) , Hale (2007) , Lewellen (2009), Floros and Travis (2011) . Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) maintain that unit IPOs solve information asymmetry problems and, enable companies that are considered risky by outsiders to signal their true value. Garner and Marshal (2007) empirically test the predictions of Schultz (1993) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) . They find that risky firms assign a higher proportion of firm value to the warrants at the time of the IPO and increase the underpricing. Boyer and Baigent (2007) and Jog and Sun (2007) confirm the prediction from the baseline papers: SPACs' initial public offerings are relatively small in size, averaging less than $100 million. They also report that SPACs have a very low value of assets and earnings.
Contrary to Garner and Marshal (2007) , both Boyer and Baigent (2008) and Jog and Sun (2007) find that SPAC units do not experience any significant underpricing. 9 Chakraborty et al. (2011) provide a potential theoretical explanation for the lack of the underpricing of unit IPOs. They find the optimal ratio of stocks and warrants in a unit. Jog and Sun (2007) and Thompson (2011) Hale (2007) and Thompson (2011) report that, on average, underwriters receive compensation of around 7% of gross proceeds obtained at the offering. Lewellen (2009) and Thompson (2011) report that part of the underwriters' compensation is deferred until consummation of the merger.
For its investors, SPACs are essentially a risk-free note plus a call option where the maturity of the note is usually two years. 10 The expiration date of the option represents the end of 9 The finding that SPACs do not experience any underpricing is confirmed also in Lewellen (2009) , Thompson (2010) , Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2011) and Ignatyeva et al. (2012) using a larger sample of SPACs both in the U.S and European markets. 10 In the early years of SPACs a unit would consist of two warrants and one share.
the pre-specified deal period where the option's strike price is equal to the expected per-share trust amount at the expiration date. The performance of SPAC securities are examined in studies that mostly focus on the performance of common shares and do not perceive SPACs as a riskfree debt plus a call option. and attribute it to returns on the risk-free note rather than a signal of the potential quality of the SPAC. Datar et al. (2012) , states that the operational performance of SPAC acquired firms are significantly inferior to their industry peers and to contemporaneous IPO firms. They report that after the merger, SPAC acquired companies that are more highly leveraged, smaller in size, have lower investment levels and lower growth opportunities than firms that conduct a conventional IPO. While comparing SPACs performance with a sample of similar IPOs, they report negative returns in the long term for both groups and underperformance of SPACs relative to the peer IPO's. In general, they recommend that investors stay away from SPACs. Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2012) report that SPACs do not exhibit IPO underpricing, with initial returns near 11 A major obstacle for the analysis of the complete financial structure of SPAC is the lack of trading data on warrants.
zero and gross spreads similar to traditional IPOs. Howe and O'Brien (2012) annual return by selling the warrant after the IPO and waiting for face value payment at liquidation. 12 The returns for leveraged investors are even higher if SPAC managers purchase additional shares before the merger in order to enhance an approval of an acquisition.
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The paper proceeds as follows: section two presents the data; section three explains institutional characteristics of SPACs in the period 2003 until 2012; section four reports the empirical tests; and section five concludes.
Data
The data are compiled from various sources. The majority of the data on the institutional characteristics of SPACs are from the SEC website and The Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. SPACs are legally obliged to report all issuance activities and any major corporate changes to The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Additionally, they are required to update the SEC with financial statements on a regular basis. We hand-collect data on important characteristics of SPACs from their initial registration S-1 forms and update 12 The strategy of selling a warrant and waiting for redemption at liquidation date is known as "yield game." 13 In an attempt to proceed with the merger combination, SPAC promoters in their proxy statements before vote offer this kind of advice "Prior to exercising conversion rights, shareholders should verify the market price of common stock, as they may receive higher proceeds from the sale of their common stock in the public market than from exercising their conversion rights." the data with information reported before the IPO event in the final prospectuses. The information from the SEC is summarized and represents our initial data. Additionally, we cross check the data with updated public information about SPACs published by Morgan Joseph. 14 In case of discrepancy, we recheck the original filings with the SEC.
We collect data on merger dates and cross-check merger dates reported to the SEC and
Morgan Joseph with the reports from major business news providers, such as Yahoo and 
Characteristics of SPACs
This section presents the institutional characteristics and changes within SPACs from 2003 to 2012. Panel A in Table 1 Comparing the activity over the three subsamples, both by volume and by percentage, shows that the first sub-period was the most successful for SPACs with 53 (49%) of them being able to conclude the merger. 
Population characteristics of SPACs
Characteristics of the SPAC population are reported in Table 2 , Panel A. We report information on a range of institutional variables that determine a SPAC at its issuance and help us to understand them better. First, it is necessary to describe SPACs and their dynamic corporate design. Second, it describes relevant information on the determinants that potentially affect the merger success of SPACs. We have complete data on all 184 companies for the following characteristics:
1. The number of founding members of the SPAC and their age; 2. Total compensation charged to SPAC founders 3. The amounts collected at the IPO and deferred until the merger combination; 4. Gross proceeds from the unit IPO; 5. Proceeds deposited in the trust account after the IPO and kept there until the merger or liquidation; 6. The warrant exercise price as determined in the pre-IPO prospectus; 7. The number of warrants issued per unit; 8. The offering price of the unit at the IPO date; 9. The number of underwriters in the syndicate; 10. The quality of the lead underwriter; 11. Classification for market sentiment and 12. The threshold level of investors needed to disapprove a merger, and thus cause liquidation of the SPAC after two years.
SPAC managers or founders are entrepreneurs with different backgrounds who, with an initial investment of $25,000, register the clean shell company and take it to IPO. Thompson (2011) reports in detail the characteristics of SPAC sponsors. Our statistics are similar to those reported there. Although we use almost all SPAC founders' characteristics reported in Thompson (2011) in the later part of our paper, here we focus on two characteristics: (1) the number of SPAC founders and (2) process of depositing money in the trust account is important since it provides a guarantee that investors in the SPAC would be able to redeem their shares at the pro rata value in case they disagree with a proposed merger combination.
Furthermore, it represents a commitment by SPAC managers to the deal since managers on average invest only $25,000 to form the SPAC and retain 20% of common shares after the IPO. The average price of a unit bundle across the sample is $8.08, with prices fairly standardized at $6, $8 and $10. An average unit consists of 1 common share and 1.3 warrants.
Owners of SPAC warrants have the option to exercise them at $6.30 after a successful merger combination. On average, 3.46 underwriters are involved in SPAC IPOs, which is approximately 4 times lower than the number of underwriters in a syndicate for a typical IPO (Corvin and Stultz, 2005) . Underwriters across the sample charge SPACs 6.88% of the gross proceeds for their services. On average, 2.3% of gross proceeds, or approximately 33% of underwriters' compensation, is deferred until the SPAC merger outcome.
The threshold level represents the maximum percentage of SPAC shareholders that could redeem their shares before the merger. This constitutes, on average 32.35% of SPAC shareholders. The last institutional characteristic for which we have complete information is the amount of warrants purchased before the IPO by SPAC promoters. On average, they buy 2.44 million warrants as a pre-commitment to the deal.
Characteristics of SPACs across samples
Comparing the institutional characteristics of SPACs across the sample, we notice changes in their structure over time. 19 The lowest number of SPAC founders, (5.42), was in the first period, while the highest number of SPAC founders, (6.33), was involved in the second period of observation. Their age across samples varies, with the highest occurring in the second period, at 51.50 years.
SPAC size in the second period is 2.5 times and 2.7 times larger than the size in period one and three, respectively. Various factors may account for the difference in SPAC size across periods. We believe that market conditions and the financial crisis had an impact on SPAC size. Similarly for the number of underwriters there is a monotonic decrease in total amount of underwriter's compensation paid by SPACs (7.43% vs. 6.94% vs. 4.73%). While total underwriter compensation declines from period to period, the deferred portion of compensation increases from 1.25% of gross proceeds in the first period to 3.29% in second period. While the deferred part of compensation in the third period is in the middle by the amount of gross proceeds, it is the largest in terms of the percentage of compensation deferred out of total compensation (18.55% vs. 47.30% vs. 47.77%). This information leads to the conclusion that 19 Appendix B has figures on relevant characteristics and their changes over time.
underwriters were aligning themselves with more merger outcomes in the period after 2006 than before.
Panel B of Table 2 reports that the proceeds deposited in the trust accounts are increasing over time, from 93% in the first to 101% in the third period. However, the threshold level that determines the percentage of investors that could block a merger increases dramatically from the first to the third period (20.47% to 84.24%). The increase in threshold level and change in voting rights is also reported in Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2011) . This reported increase in threshold level is the response of SPAC founders to the activism of institutional investors reported in previous studies (Lewellen, 2009 , Tran, 2010 , Vulanovic, 2010 , Cumming et. al., 2012 .
The characteristics of a unit as a security changed significantly. 
Merger Determinants and Characteristics
This section examine institutional characteristics of SPACs and answers whether these determinants impact merger outcomes of SPACs
Institutional Characteristics of SPACs that Merged
The merger is the ultimate reason for the existence of SPACs. Upon merger, all vested parties could experience positive returns. If SPAC founders are not able to execute the merger before the IPO determined date, they are required to return all proceeds kept in the trust accounts to its investors and liquidate. Panel A in Table 3 shows that merged SPACs are smaller in size to those that liquidated, $130.51 million compared with $141.55 million. Merged SPACs also have smaller trust funds deposited in escrow accounts than liquidated ones, 0.95% and 0.97%, respectively. Both the units and warrants of SPACs that merged are priced at a lower value than the liquidated ones.
There is no difference between the two groups for the number of underwriters, the threshold level and the number of warrants purchased by SPAC managers before the IPO.
Merger Determinants
We evaluate whether important corporate determinants of SPACs impact the probability of merger. Thirty seven explanatory variables are used for evaluation and we discuss each of them as well as their expected impact on merger. Twelve of these variables are listed among the fourteen variables reported in Tables 2 and 3 . We exclude total underwriters compensation and underwriters allowance since we use the components that comprise total compensation in our analysis.
The first set of defining characteristics of SPACs centers on SPAC founders. We reported previously the number of founders involved in a SPAC (Found_number) and their average age.
We expect that both of these variables would impact the probability of merger of the SPAC in a positive way. The more founders involved in a SPAC means that their collective knowledge would be greater and therefore beneficial in properly executing, first, the IPO and, later, in finding a target company to merge with. Following the same logic we hypothesize that the age of founders have a positive impact on merger.
In addition to the above variables, we construct four additional dummy variables that describe founders' characteristics. Looking in the final prospectuses before the IPO, we extract disclosed information on the founders' involvement in blank check issuance prior to 2003 and their involvement in other SPAC and create dummy variable Found_SPACs. If the SPAC founders were previously involved in the blank check industry we code the information as 1 for a particular SPAC and 0 otherwise. Our expectation is that previous involvement in the blank check industry by SPAC founders may contribute to the increase in the probability of a merger.
In a similar manner we create three remaining dummy variables: Found_PEVC, Fund_Inst and Sadvisor. The variable Found_PEVC discloses the prior involvement of SPAC founders in private equity and venture capital industry. Since SPACs can be considered a financial innovation or a new asset class and, by some, are recognized as venture capital companies, we hypothesize that prior involvement in the private equity and venture capital industry increases the probability of a successful merger. We have the same prediction for Underwriters have an important role in the success of SPACs. They work with SPAC founders and structure their IPOs. After the IPO, they are market makers for SPAC securities.
Millstream Acquisition Company, the first SPAC to go public in 2003, is considered an invention of its underwriter, the investment bank EarlyBirdCapital. Vulanovic (2010) reports that six underwriters participated in at least 20% of SPAC deals. 20 After the first SPAC successfully went public, EarlyBirdCapital participated in more than forty-five IPOs, either as the lead underwriter or as a member of the underwriting syndicate. Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2011) observe that the involvement of EarlyBirdCapital in the underwriting of a SPAC increased the probability of the merger. For that reason, we create a dummy variable, EBCAP, that reports the involvement of EarlyBirdCapital as the lead underwriter, as we believe that its participation would positively impact merger outcomes. Following the same logic, we create two more variables to report the involvement of investment banks Morgan Joseph and Citigroup as underwriters and name them Mjoseph and Citi. Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013) report that underwriters typically charge a fee of 7% of gross proceeds, but on average defer half of the fee, or 3.4% of gross proceeds, until the merger is completed. This behavior aligns the incentives of underwriters with the SPAC founders with respect to the success of a merger. Corvin and Stultz (2005) syndicates led by the same book manager. They argue that the stronger the relationship between issuers and underwriters, the more active role the syndicate members will play in selling IPOs, determining IPO value, or providing aftermarket services.
Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) observe similar behavior when syndicate members are required to provide an effort that is difficult to observe. Four underwriter-related variables are used in our tests.
The first underwriter related variable is the percentage of gross proceeds (UNDgrosspr) that they collect at the time of the IPO. We expect that a decrease in underwriters' compensation would be beneficial for SPAC merger outcomes.
The second is the amount of deferred compensation (Udef) as a percentage of gross proceeds. We hypothesize that the increase in the deferred part of compensation leads to an increase in the probability of a merger. This is because underwriters commit to collect this compensation conditional on merger outcome.
The third variable is the number of underwriters in the syndicate (Undn). We do not have clear prediction on how the number of underwriters would affect merger outcomes. On one hand the involvement of more underwriters means easier distribution of the shares at the IPO and more diverse investors which could be helpful for SPAC, on the other hand having less underwriters makes easier for a SPAC to get more of their attention.
The fourth variable that defines underwriters and potentially impacts merger outcomes is the quality of the lead underwriter in the SPAC (Und_Q). We construct this underwriter's quality variable as a dummy, a value of 1 is assigned if the underwriter is a lesser known investment bank that participated in the SPAC market since the beginning, such as EarlyBirdCapital, Morgan Joseph, Maxim Group, Gun Allen etc. The value of 0 is assigned to the SPAC if the lead underwriter is a well-known financial institution such as Citigroup, Bank of America, Meryl Lynch, Lazard and similar. We expect that the involvement of lesser-known underwriters, who were more deeply involved in the SPAC underwriting, has a positive impact on merger.
Until the introduction of tender offer by 57th Street Acquisition Company in 2010, the majority of shareholders had to support merger in the meeting. In order to proceed with a merger, it was necessary that only a certain number of shareholders could redeem their shares before the merger, in addition to securing approval by the majority of shareholders, SPAC managers and underwriters. In the first sub-period for all SPACs, the threshold was 20% of shareholders. This threshold rule was an important incentive for hedge funds and institutional investors to participate in the SPAC by playing a "yield game" and by focusing on short-term returns.
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Appendix B depicts the changes in threshold level over time and shows relatively large increases. It is hypothesized that a higher threshold improves the probability of a merger.
Two important variables describe the commitment of SPAC promoters to the deal. One variable is the amount of proceeds in the trust fund. The second is the number of warrants that SPAC promoters buy and deposit before the IPO into a trust account (Proceedsintrust). SPAC promoters with initial investments of $25,000 purchase approximately 20% equity in a SPAC at the IPO. As a result of these characteristics, every new SPAC investor experiences significant dilution. Miller (2008) reports of "warrant overhang" and explains how it leads to a high dilution. He proposes that, in the future, SPACs decrease the number of warrants in a unit. Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013) report approximately 30% dilution if no conversion rights are exercised. If the conversion threshold goes up to 20%, the dilution increases to more than 40%. 21 It is well known attempt by Goldman Sachs in 2008 to create a "Super SPAC" that would focus on long term investors and offer them only ½ of a warrant in a unit. Super SPAC has not materialized but underwriters and SPAC founder increased the threshold number at the time.
The dilution effect is lowered when managers purchase warrants. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the merger outcomes. The fact that these purchased warrants are deposited in the trust in addition to original IPO proceeds, we hypothesize that increase in the trust is also increasing probability of merger.
The size of a SPAC (Grossproceeds) is another determinant that potentially explains the success of a merger. Our summary statistics showed that size varies from period to period and most likely corresponds with the state of the financial market. We do not have a clear expectation on the effect of the size of the SPAC. Although it seems that SPACs with close to a 100% cash entity should benefit from its size, it is unknown what the demand is. Following the same reasoning, we do not have a clear expectation about the impact of a unit IPO price on the merger.
Given the dilution effects and warrant overhang, it is expected that the decrease in the number of warrants per unit (Warrantsperunit) would be beneficial for a SPAC. We are uncertain of what effect the exercise price of warrants could have.
To account for the dynamic financial markets and environment surrounding SPACs' limited life after the IPO, we use variables widely discussed in finance and economics literature that potentially capture these changes and may impact merger outcomes. The variables are denoted: IPO_Hot; VIX, Russel_2000, Russel_Ann, Ecindex Confid_Exp and AnnDays_IPO.
We create a dummy variable for the state of the IPO market (IPO_Hot), coding it 1 for the years when the IPO activity is above the average and 0 otherwise. By definition, SPACs and other companies are competitors in the IPO market. Higher interest in other companies limits the ability of SPACs to raise capital. But it is possible that investor demand increases during "hot" years, which is enough to both increase the interest in SPACs and other companies. Therefore, we do not have a clear expectation for this variable on SPAC mergers.
To account for the dynamics of financial markets as a predictive variable, we use the Volatility Index (VIX), which was created by the Chicago Board Option Exchange. SPACs, by their structure, keep all the proceeds in the trust account with credible financial institutions and are therefore prone to the immediate negative consequences of changes in the market. Given the behavior of investors when volatility is observed in the markets, the increase in volatility may lead to a higher willingness of investors to invest in a SPAC and potentially higher interest for successful merger outcome.
We intentionally use Russel_2000 and Russel_Ann to capture the state of the market for We create four variables based on geographic focus of SPACs for the four most frequently targeted countries outside the U.S. They are China, Israel, Greece and India. In a similar fashion we create variables with the focus on either private equity (PEtarget) or health sector (HCtarg) in the U.S. For both of these, we expect positive impacts on the merger probability.
Finally, to account for the fact that a few SPACs in the sample, as measured by size, are outliers, we create a dummy variable Sizedummy.
Regression Analysis and Results
We use logistic regression to determine the impact of SPAC characteristics on mergers.
The sample includes 163 companies with complete data points on all thirty seven possible merger determinants. We exclude from the population of 184 SPACs the 21 SPACs with unresolved corporate status at the time of the final observation. We include seven SPACs that executed their IPO by issuing units with dual class shares, contrary to Cumming et. al. (2012) .
The reason for their inclusion is that the gross proceeds raised by a second class of shares are negligible in comparison to the size of the IPO, and that all other characteristics of these 7
SPACs are identical to the rest of the SPACs. Our observed variable is "merged" and is coded as 1 if the SPAC successfully merged and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 4 .
The logistic regression procedure eliminates two independent variables form our sample that perfectly predict merger outcomes, namely PEtarget and Sizedummy. This leaves us with thirty five characteristics that potentially impact merger outcomes. We discuss variables with statistically significant impact on the probability of merger outcome for SPACs.
The number of SPAC founders (Found_number) positively impacts the probability of the merger outcomes. This confirms our expectation.
VIX also showed a positive impact on the merger outcome. It seems that investors consider SPAC as a substitute for financial assets that underperform in volatile markets.
Russel_2000 has a slightly negative impact.
SPACs that focus on China are more likely to execute merger combination. The same is true for SPACs that have an outlined focus in their prospectus. In agreement with previous findings, the involvement of EarlyBirdCapital (Ebcap) in the SPAC IPO process significantly increases the likelihood of the merger. Finally, the further the announcement date is from the IPO date the lower the chance of the SPAC to successfully conduct the merger transaction. None of the remaining variables have a statistically significant impact on the merger outcomes.
To confirm our results we run modified OLS with dependent dummy variable and we obtain similar coefficients.
Conclusions
We describe changes in the SPAC structure over time and document that in a relatively short time-frame they significantly redesigned their corporate structure by adjusting their size, the amount of the IPO proceeds deposited in the escrow accounts, the number of the warrants purchased upfront by its founders and the percentage of deferred compensation awarded to the underwriters. All these changes are attempts by SPAC stakeholders to increase the likelihood of merger outcomes. When we test for the impact of these defining characteristics on the merger outcomes, only some of them show a statistically significant impact on merger. As a policy suggestion, it pays off to have the IPO underwritten by EarlyBirdCapital, have a stated focus in the prospectus and that the focus be on China. Additionally, it is worthwhile to have a larger team when a SPAC enters the market and to find the merger target as soon as possible.
This paper adds to the existing literature on SPACs by further examining the major determinants of SPAC mergers. Yet, additional empirical investigation may be called for.
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